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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 




Pedro Diaz, 89-A-2329 
Marcy Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 3600 
Marcy, NY 13403-3600 · 
Marcy CF 
08-039-19 B 
July 2019 decisi~n, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months. 
Cruse, Alexander 
Appellant's Briefreceived October 10, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation . . . 
Records relied upon:. Pre~Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrwnent, Offender Cas~ 
Plan. 
-~~.undersigned determine tha~ the decision appealed is hereby: 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
_ ,.. 
_Vacate~, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the .EinatDe(ei:mination--is·at variance with Fi.ndings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons ro·r the Parole ~oard's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate.and the Inmate;s Counsel, if any, on .. ~/a.4j ,j.0JU '(ffi{) . 
Distribut~on: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst: Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
..._. 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Diaz, Pedro DIN: 89-A-2329  
Facility: Marcy CF AC No.:  08-039-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 2) 
 
Appellant challenges the July 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant pushing the female victim and her two 
young children into their apartment, threatening them with a knife, taking gold chains and rings 
from the victim, raping and sodomizing the victim in the presence of her daughter, dragging the 
victim into the living room, cutting her across the neck from ear to ear three times, suffocating her 
with his hands, and holding the children at knifepoint before he was forced to flee. Appellant 
argues that the Board did not have the jurisdiction to conduct a standard reappearance interview 
because the Board failed to hold a rescission hearing after previously setting conditions for his 
conditional release. This argument is without merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
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The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Attempted Murder in the second degree, Rape 
in the first degree, Unlawful Imprisonment in the first degree, Sodomy in the first degree, Robbery 
in the first degree, and Assault in the first degree; Appellant’s criminal history including a prior 
state term of incarceration; Appellant’s institutional efforts including one Tier II infraction since 
his last appearance and enrollment in sex offender programming for the highest risk offenders; and 
release plans to live at a shelter and work in construction. The Board also had before it and 
considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, 
and letters of support and assurance. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the vicious instant offense, Appellant’s need to complete 
required programming, and Appellant’s failure to articulate insight into the crime and the harm he 
caused. See Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 
240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Olmosperez v. Evans, 114 A.D.3d 1077, 1078, 980 N.Y.S.2d 845, 
846 (3d Dept. 2014), affd 26 N.Y.3d 1014, 21 N.Y.S.3d 686 (2015); Matter of Almeyda v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 
1997); Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007); Matter of Almeyda v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002). The Board 
also encouraged Appellant to spend time solidifying his release plans. See, e.g., Matter of 
Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board does not have the jurisdiction to conduct a standard 
reappearance interview is without merit. The Board is required to interview inmates for 
reconsideration every 24 months pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.3(b). The Board’s determination with respect to discretionary release is a distinct basis for 
release that has no impact on conditional release. A review of the record reveals that conditions 
for Appellant’s conditional release were set in 2017 but he subsequently lost his good time. 
Appellant’s impression that a rescission hearing is required is misplaced inasmuch as he was never 
given an open date. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
